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The end of the waterfall :   
default resources of central counterparties 
 
 
Central counterparties (CCPs) have become pillars of the new global financial architecture 
following the financial crisis of 2008. The key role of CCPs in mitigating counterparty risk 
and contagion has in turn cast them as systemically important financial institutions whose 
eventual failure may lead to potentially serious consequences for financial stability, and 
prompted discussions on CCP risk management standards and safeguards for recovery and 
resolutions of CCPs in case of failure. We contribute to the debate on CCP default resources 
by focusing on the incentives generated by the CCP loss allocation rules for the CCP and its 
members and discussing how the design of loss allocation rules may be used to align these 
incentives in favor of outcomes which benefit financial stability. After reviewing the 
ingredients of the CCP loss waterfall and various proposals for loss recovery provisions for 
CCPs, we examine the risk management incentives created by different ingredients in the 
loss waterfall and discuss possible approaches for validating the design of the waterfall.  
We emphasize the importance of CCP stress tests and  argue that such stress tests need to 
account for  the interconnectedness of CCPs through common members and cross-margin 
agreements. A key proposal is that capital charges on assets held against CCP Default Funds 
should depend on the quality of the risk management of the CCP, as assessed through 
independent stress tests.  
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1. CCPs: bulwarks against systemic risk or new ‘Too Big To Fail’ entities? 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, one of the key ingredients in proposals for regulatory 
reform has been the (mandatory) clearing of over-the-counter (OTC) derivative transactions 
through central counterparties (CCPs). Guidelines present in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the Basel Committee’s proposal for regulatory reform (Basel III), and the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)  emphasize mandatory central clearing of 
standardized OTC derivatives for regulated financial institutions and capital surcharges for 
non-centrally cleared derivatives transactions, casting CCPs as pillars of the new global 
financial  architecture.  
 
Figure 1:   Central clearing involves replacing each bilateral over-the-counter trade by a pair 
	   
End of the Waterfall: Default resources of CCPs 
4	  
of symmetric trades intermediated by a central counterparty CCP. 
 
Central clearing involves replacing each bilateral trade between  between a pair of 
counterparties by a pair of symmetric trades with a central counterparty (CCP), which then 
becomes counterparty to both sides of the trade (Figure 1). Trades cleared through the CCP 
are subject to collateral requirements:  all counterparties, called ‘Clearing Members’, post 
Initial Margin requirements corresponding to an assessment of the risk of their position with 
the CCP. Collateral requirements are computed using a standardized approach for all 
counterparties and regularly updated through (daily or more frequent) margin calls.  
Central clearing, when properly implemented and subject to adequate risk management 
safeguards, can be  a powerful tool for mitigating counterparty risk and contagion. The 
merits of CCPs include the reduction of exposures through multilateral netting across 
counterparties (Acharya & Bisin 2014; Duffie & Zhu 2011; Cont & Kokholm 2014), the 
reduction of counterparty risk through transparent collateral requirements, the reduction of 
operational risk, the enhancement of price discovery   and  regulatory transparency in OTC 
markets, and the improvement of risk management standards. These benefits are illustrated 
by the observation that many OTC markets had implemented central clearing well before 
being mandated to do so by recent legislation. 
Figure 2 illustrates how channeling bilateral OTC exposures through a CCP can reduce the 
overall level of exposures through multilateral netting (Cont & Kokholm 2014). The same 
example also illustrates how a chain of exposures, which may potentially lead to contagion in 
case one element in the chain defaults, is broken by central clearing through a CCP. This 
feature, together with the fact that all Clearing Members are subject to collateral 
requirements, helps mitigate the counterparty risk and the associated risk of contagion which 
may arise from OTC exposures (Cont & Minca, 2014). 
  
Figure 2: Bilateral vs multilateral netting. When there are a sufficient number of market 
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participants, central clearing leads to a reduction of exposures through multilateral netting 
across counterparties. 
An important feature of central clearing is the standardization –and centralization- of 
collateral requirements for all participants in OTC transactions, which has not been the case 
for bilateral OTC transaction. Although this entails a cost for market participants, it also 
reduces operational risk and legal risk associated with collateral disputes in bilateral 
transactions, by deferring margin calculations to the CCP. This may trigger in turn the 
standardization of data formats and risk models for cleared transactions. 
The potential benefits of central clearing are, however, conditional on the availability of 
sufficient liquidity resources for the CCP to maintain its clearing operations through market 
stress scenarios, which in turn hinges on the adequacy of the risk management of the CCP. 
The increasingly important role given to CCPs in mitigating counterparty risk and contagion 
has in turn cast them as systemically important financial institutions whose eventual failure 
may lead to potentially serious consequences for financial stability and prompted discussions 
on CCP risk management standards and safeguards for recovery and resolutions of CCPs in 
case of failure. By concentrating counterparty risk in CCPs and increasing the range and 
volume of cleared instruments, central clearing mandates have turned some CCPs into « Too 
Important to Fail » entities, whose failure would be a catastrophic event. Accordingly, 
market participants have voiced legitimate concerns about the risk management procedures 
used by CCPs, the adequacy of their resources in the event of the default of one or several 
Clearing Members and the procedures to follow in the event of a CCP’s failure (BlackRock 
2014, JP Morgan 2014). 
A CCP may incur losses due to market variations of assets held on its balance sheet (non-
default losses) as well losses due to the default of its Clearing Members. Non-default losses 
are absorbed by the CCP’s capital, which in this respect is subject to adequacy rules similar 
in spirit to that of a bank. What makes a CCP different from a bank is its exposures to losses 
stemming from the default of Clearing Members, and CCPs have developed various “default 
resources” to deal with these exposures. The current debate focuses on the adequacy of 
these default resources and what to do once these resources are depleted.   
A key issue is the regulation and supervision of CCPs and their Clearing Members. Close 
examination of the incentives of the CCP and its Clearing members reveals that  the absence 
of appropriate regulation may lead to outcomes where the CCP may become a source of 
systemic risk rather than a safeguard against it (Cont 2010; Murphy 2012; Acharya  & Bisin 
2014; Cont & Minca 2014). In absence of proper regulation, the presence of multiple CCPs,  
may generate a “race to the bottom”, allocating the largest market share to CCPs which have 
the lowest collateral requirements (Santos & Scheinkman, 2001).  
This note contributes to the debate on CCP default resources by focusing on the incentives 
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generated by the CCP loss allocation rules for the CCP and its members and discussing how 
the design of loss allocation rules may be used to align these incentives in favor of outcomes 
which benefit financial stability. After reviewing the ingredients of the CCP loss waterfall 
and various proposals for recovery provisions for CCPs, we examine the risk management 
incentives created by different ingredients of the loss waterfall and discuss possible 
approaches for validating the design of the waterfall.  
We emphasize the importance of CCP stress tests and  argue that such stress tests need to 
account for  the interconnectedness of CCPs through common members and cross-margin 
agreements. A key proposal is that capital charges on assets held against CCP Default Funds 
should depend on the quality of the risk management of the CCP, as assessed through 
independent stress tests. 
Finally, we discuss different options for the recovery of a failing CCP, emphasizing the 
interplay between liquidity and solvency constraints and the risk incentives resulting from  
each type of recovery mechanism.  
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2. Provisioning for default losses: the CCP loss waterfall 
 
Clearing Members bring to the CCP a set of bilateral transactions for clearing. In any 
contract, the sum of long and short positions is zero (clearing condition). Both parties pay 
an initial margin as well as a contribution to the CCP Default Fund. 
 
Each member periodically pays or receives a variation margin  corresponding to the variation 
of the market value of its open positions. The sum across members of all variation margins 
paid and received is zero due to the clearing condition so, if all members pay in the variation 
margins due to the CCP, the CCP then simply acts as a pass-thru and transfers it to the 
members whose mark-to-market variation is positive. As long as members have not 
defaulted, variation margin payments sum to zero. So the CCPs are affected by market risk 
of member portfolios only in scenarios where one or more Clearing Members default.  
 
If one or several members default, the margin payments are not zero-sum anymore: 
defaulting members may fail to pay the variation margin due to the CCP and the CCP then 
liquidates their open positions, typically through an auction. During this process the CCP 
continues to honor all variation margin payments to open positions of non-defaulted 
members, which may entail a loss for the CCP. Due to continuous (e.g. daily) variation 
margin payments, the CCP is only exposed to losses which occur at or following the 
member’s default. 
 
To fulfill its role, a  CCP thus needs to maintain financial resources that can absorb losses in 
the event of their members defaulting. These include  
 
-margin requirements collected from Clearing Members 
-a Default Fund, to which all Clearing Members are required to contribute, designed to 
absorb losses that exceed the initial margin posted by defaulting members, and 
-the CCP’s own equity. 
 
The “loss waterfall” describes how these resources available are used to absorb potential 
losses arising from the default of Clearing Members: 
 
1. The first layer of protection against losses is provided by the margin requirements. Each 
Clearing Member maintains a margin requirement with the CCP, sometimes called ‘Initial 
Margin’, which corresponds to a measure of the risk of the member’s portfolio over a 
risk horizon. The risk horizon ranges from one to several days, depending on the asset 
class being cleared. The level of margin requirements is typically set to cover potential 
market losses in the Clearing Member’s positions over the risk horizon over a range of 
scenarios.  
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A common approach has been to set the level of margin requirements for a Clearing 
Member to cover losses of the member’s portfolio in a set of risk scenarios 
corresponding to possible portfolio losses over the risk horizon. This set may be a set of 
scenarios fixed in advance by the CCP (as in the CME’s Standard Portfolio Analysis, or 
SPAN, approach), a set of historical scenarios (historical Value-at-Risk) or a set of 
scenarios simulated using a statistical model. The margin requirement may then be 
computed as the worst case loss (in the SPAN method) a loss quantile  (VaR) or 
Expected Shortfall (tail conditional expectation) at a certain confidence level, which may 
be 99% or higher. The margin level may then be interpreted as the amount of collateral 
required to absorb losses in a proportion of scenarios given by the confidence level. 
  
The initial margin paid in by each member may only be used to absorb the losses arising 
from the member’s portfolio, but cannot be used to offset losses of other members or 
other losses incurred by the CCP. 
 
2. If the loss exceeds the initial margin contribution, the failing member’s Default Fund 
contribution is  used to offset the additional losses. 
3. If the loss exceeds the sum of the defaulting member’s margin and Default Fund 
contribution: 
- first the CCP makes a limited (capped) contribution to offset the remaining loss: this 
contribution is sometimes referred to as “skin-in-the-game”. 
- if the CCP’s contribution in insufficient, the Default Funds of other members are used 
to absorb remaining losses. 
4. If the losses exceed the size of the Default Fund, the CCPs may have recourse to: 
-an additional contribution from the CCP’s own capital 
-an additional contribution to the Default Fund by non-defaulting Clearing Members: 
this “assessment” is sometimes uncapped and sometimes capped by the initial 
contribution of the members.  
 
5. Recovery: If the above resources are not sufficient for absorbing the losses resulting 
from the default of Clearing Members, then the CCP may take extraordinary measures to 
replenish its resources and maintain continuity of its clearing operations. These measures 
are known as the “recovery plan”. Some solutions which have been considered are: 
 
-Variation Margin Haircutting (VMGH): during the recovery phase the CCP continues to 
collect variation margin payments from members with negative P&L but does not 
transfer them entirely to their counterparties, retaining  a portion for replenishing its 
resources.  
 
-tear-up of contracts: in some cases the CCP may decide to close (i.e. liquidate) some 
positions of CCP members.  
	   
End of the Waterfall: Default resources of CCPs 
9	  
-“initial margin haircuts”: some proposals include the use of initial margin of non-
defaulted members as a source of funds for the CCP’s recovery. 
 
We discuss below the relative merits of these and other recovery provisions. 
 
6. Failure Resolution: If recovery measures fail to replenish the resources of the CCP or if 
the CCP or its members choose not to proceed with recovery measures, the CCP might 
eventually become insolvent or lack the liquidity resources for continuing its operations, 
resulting in default or requiring the use of resolution powers by authorities.  Alternatively, 
the regulators may choose to trigger the failure resolution regime before failure actually 
occurs. The triggers for entry into resolution may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
 
The failure of a CCP is an undesirable outcome which may impair the stability of the 
financial system. It is therefore understandable that failure resolution of CCPs has 
focused a lot of debate. An important component of this debate has focused on the legal 
regime most appropriate for the resolution of a CCP, loss allocation in the resolution 
phase and the legal and financial implications of resolution for CCP members and their 
clients. Duffie (2014) gives an excellent and up-to-date discussion of these important 
issues. 
 
By contrast, less discussion has been devoted to preventive measures which could reduce 
the likelihood of failure in the first place. These measures relate to the design of the loss 
waterfall, not only in terms of the loss absorbing capacity of its various components but 
also in terms of the resulting incentives for the CCP and its Clearing Members. 
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Figure 3: The loss waterfall of a CCP.  
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CCP risk management systems are subject to approval and periodic review by regulators. In 
practice, such reviews have typically focused on backtesting of margin levels for clearing 
member portfolios and assessing whether the size of the Default Fund corresponds to the 
regulatory guideline of covering the liquidation costs for one (or two) clearing member 
defaults.  Such backtesting procedures assess the effectiveness  of the waterfall design in 
covering losses in  stress scenarios and are  necessary for the validation of a CCP’s risk 
management model.  
 
However, an equally important issue in assessing the design of the waterfall concerns  the 
risk management incentives it provides to the CCP and the clearing members in advance of 
such stress scenarios.  A well-designed loss waterfall should provide  the right risk 
management incentives to Clearing Members and the CCP to steer away as much as possible 
from configurations that may lead to failure of the CCP. We will now examine the 
ingredients of the loss waterfall from the perspective of the incentives they generate for the 
CCP and its members. 
 
3. Margin requirements 
 
Margin requirements for Clearing Members are typically computed based on a measure of 
market risk for the Clearing Member’s positions over the risk horizon. The risk horizon, in 
current practice, depends on the asset class being cleared and ranges from one to several 
days. 
 
Choices for the risk measure include  
-scenario based approaches, such as CME’s “Standard Portfolio Analysis approach” 
(SPAN), which evaluate the worst loss of the portfolio across a range of scenarios; 
 
-statistical risk measures, such as Value at Risk (VaR) or Expected Shortfall (ES) or variants 
of these, such as “truncated Tail Conditional Expectation”, which is a robust version of 
Expected Shortfall  (Cont, Deguest & Scandolo, 2010).  These risk measures are usually 
computed at a confidence level which ranges from 99% to 99.75%, depending on CCPs. 
The estimation of these risk measures involves statistical assumptions on the risk factors 
affecting the Clearing Member’s portfolios.  
 
3.1 Backtesting of margin requirements  
 
Different assumptions lead to different values for margin requirements and, even within an 
asset class, there is often no consensus on model and parameter choices. As a result, margin 
requirements for identical portfolios cleared in different CCPs may be quite different and 
one may observe differences up to 50% in some cases. Given the difference in assumptions 
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across models, a higher confidence level does not necessarily imply higher margin 
requirements: for example, a 99.75% Value at Risk computed in a Gaussian model may be in 
fact less conservative than a 99% Value at Risk in a model with heavy-tailed risk factors. 
Thus, the adequacy of margin requirements must be assessed using an objective criterion 
which is comparable across models. 
 
A common approach to the validation of margin requirements is ‘historical back testing’: the 
margin requirements are computed for a set of portfolios (often, the Clearing Member 
portfolios) every day using historical data  and compared with the subsequent   (out of 
sample) T-day realized, where T is the risk horizon. Various criteria, such as the frequency 
and the clustering in time of loss in excess of margin, are used to assess the adequacy of the 
level of margin requirements. This procedure, similar to the one used for backtesting risk 
models for bank portfolios, leads to a result which is comparable across models if the same 
historical data set is used. CCPs should be equipped with the necessary data and 
computational resources for performing such backtests systematically on Clearing Member 
portfolios, as some already do.  
 
Historical backtesting, though necessary and useful, yield an incomplete assessment of the 
adequacy of margin requirements: they are restricted to a set of historical scenarios which 
may or may not be representative of potential stress scenarios facing the CCP, and only 
consider current positions of Clearing Members. 
 
A more comprehensive validation should involve not just  current Clearing Member 
portfolios but also hypothetical ‘test’ portfolios which may represent possible positions that 
members may bring to the CCP. This allows to track potential weaknesses in the margin 
calculations and identify “worst-case portfolios” whose risk may not be captured by the 
margin requirements. 
 
3.2. Pro-cyclicality in margin requirements 
 
Margin requirements are computed, either directly through historical simulation or indirectly 
through a  statistical model,   using recent market data.1 The use of (a sliding window of) 
recent market data introduces procyclicality in the margin requirements. Margin levels 
increase following an episode of market turbulence, due to updating of risk factor volatilities. 
Conversely, episodes of severe market turbulence, such as the crisis of 2008, are ‘forgotten’ 
by the model once they are not part of the estimation window.  Accordingly, recent 
regulatory guidelines (in particular EMIR) have recommended to introduce ‘pro-cyclicality 
adjustments’ in margin requirements. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Regulatory guidelines recommend to use at least 2 years of historical data for parameter estimation and in 
practice the data set used for model estimation ranges between 2 to  5 years.  
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When margin requirements are computed through historical simulation (for example, 
historical VaR), a simple way to avoid pro-cyclicality  is to include a (fixed) set of ‘stress 
scenarios’ in the scenarios being used for the margin calculation. These stress scenarios may 
either correspond to historical episodes of market stress which may fall outside the 
estimation window, or correspond to counterfactual, but realistic, co-movements of risk 
factors.  
 
When margin requirements are computed using model-based calculations or simulations, 
pro-cyclicality  may be attenuated by using a floor (minimum value) for risk factor 
volatilities. These floors may be estimated using a longer data set including past episodes of 
market stress, thus rendering them robust to changes in the data set. Using such floor levels 
also makes the initial margin requirements more stable and less sensitive to day-by-day 
market fluctuations (which should be primarily be captured by the variation margin). 
 
The use of similar models for margin calculations across different CCPs is also a factor of 
procyclicality: models using similar methodologies or based on similar inputs will lead to 
simultaneous  increases in margin requirements. Although regulators tend to be conforted by 
the use of ‘commonly used’ models for margin calculations, the diversity of models is in fact 
desirable from the perspective of mitigating procyclicality. 
 
3.3. Correlation breakdown, worst-case scenarios and portfolio crowding 
 
When initial margin is computed at the portfolio level, rather than at single instrument level, 
the calculation involves assumptions on correlations, or ‘offsets’, of gains and losses across 
different instruments. Historical risk calculations implicitly assume that the historical 
dependence structure of risk factors will remain stable; model-based or simulation-based 
margin calculations may involve explicit assumptions on the dependence structure of risk 
factors, typically estimated from recent market data. We will refer to these assumptions as 
the ‘baseline scenario’.  However, empirical studies and theoretical models both point to the 
possibility that ‘historical correlation’ assumptions may fail to hold in market crisis scenarios 
leasding either to sharp increase or decrease in correlation levels (Cont & Wagalath, 2013), 
for reasons which are endogenous to the origin of market correlations. It is therefore 
important to consider, when computing initial margin requirements, ‘correlation stress 
scenarios’ where the dependence structure of risk factors may be stronger or weaker than 
the baseline scenario based on historical data. Considering such scenarios, which are not 
based on recent market data, also has the benefit of reducing the procyclicality of margin 
requirements by attenuating their dependence on recent market moves which affect 
correlation levels used in the baseline scenario.  
 
Another useful complement to historical backtesting is ‘reverse stress testing’: instead of 
verifying the frequency of excess losses above margin across a given set of scenarios, one 
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attempts to identify extreme but plausible scenario(s) which maximize excess losses above 
margin for current member portfolios.  
 
The nature of these ‘worst case scenarios’ give an insight into the risks the CCP is exposed 
to. When derivatives positions are involved, these ‘worst case scenarios’ may be in fact quite 
different from tail scenarios for the underlying risk factors. For example, the worst case 
scenario for a ‘straddle position’ (long position in an out-of-the money call and an out-of-
the-money put) is that the underlying asset does not move.   Similarly, when several 
correlated risk factors are involved, worst case scenarios may involve complex co-
movements in the risk factors which may correspond to typical, rather than ‘tail’, scenarios. 
 
Examination of ‘worst case scenarios’ is also useful for assessing the dependence of tail risks 
across Clearing Members: if many Clearing Members are exposed to the same ‘worst case 
scenarios’, this reveals a ‘crowding risk’ across member portfolios which implies that these 
Clearing Members may be simultaneously subject to large margin calls if such scenarios 
occur. Clearing Members, being unaware of other members’ positions, may fail to take this 
risk into account. This should prompt the CCP to increase the margin requirements for such 
portfolios. 
 
3.4. Accounting for liquidation costs 
 
It should be clear from the description of the CCP loss waterfall that the only scenarios in 
which the CCP is exposed to losses in a Clearing member’s portfolios are scenarios where 
this Clearing Member defaults. In this case, the CCP typically liquidates the defaulting 
member’s positions. Any loss incurred in the process of liquidation is therefore realized as a 
liquidation cost. Whereas the margin requirements are computed by assessing the market risk 
of a Clearing Member’s position over  a (fixed) risk horizon T, the result may be 
substantially different from the liquidation cost due to several reasons: 
 
-Bid-ask spreads: the liquidation of a portfolio with long and short positions involves an 
unwinding cost which, for small positions, is proportional to the bid-ask spread of the 
instruments involved. Thus, two positions with the same market risk but different bid-ask 
spreads entail different liquidation costs, which is not accounted for in margin requirements 
based on market risk measures such as VaR or Expected Shortfall. 
 
-Liquidation horizon for large positions: orderly unwinding of positions whose magnitude is large 
compared to the market depth may not be feasible over the (pre-specified) risk horizon and 
may require more time. For example, if a CDS position whose size is  twice the magnitude 
of daily trading volume is liquidated at the rate of 20% of daily volume, its orderly 
liquidation requires 10 days, rather than the 5-day risk horizon conventionally used for CDS 
margin calculations. As observed in this example, for large positions the liquidation horizon 
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may be larger than the risk horizon for margin calculations and increases proportionally to 
the position size.  
 
A consequence of this  is a nonlinear scaling of liquidation costs with portfolio size. Recall 
that commonly used risk measures such as standard deviation, VaR or Expected Shortfall, 
when computed over  a fixed horizon T, are proportional to the notional size N of the 
portfolio and typically have a square-root ( √T ) dependence with respect to the horizon. 
If the liquidation horizon itself increases linearly with the notional size N, as explained 
above, then the overall dependence of the risk measure with respect to the position size N 
will be  proportional to N √N = N3/2.  Thus, if the notional size of the position is increased 
by a factor 4, standard deviation, VaR or Expected Shortfall would increase by a factor 4 but 
the liquidation cost typically increases by a factor 4 √4=8.  
 
These arguments show commonly used market risk measures such as VaR or Expected 
shortfall do not yield a  proper evaluation of liquidation costs: they do not use any 
information on market depth or bid ask spreads and scale linearly with positions size. 
Collateral requirements for CCP members should not be solely based on an evaluation of 
the market risk of their portfolio but include an additional liquidity charge which corresponds 
to the potential additional cost incurred by the CCP for liquidating the member’s portfolio in 
an extreme but plausible market scenario. In the example above, the liquidity charge would 
correspond to the difference between an estimation of the liquidity cost of the portfolio and 
a measure of its market risk (VaR, Expected Shortfall, etc) over the standard risk horizon T: 
 
Collateral Requirement = Market Risk requirement + Liquidity Charge 
          over standard risk horizon 
 
Whereas the first component typically increases proportionally with position size, the 
Liquidity Charge should increase faster than linearly, as argued above, reflecting the higher 
liquidation cost per dollar notional for large, concentrated positions. Thus, when applied to 
portfolios which have the same market risk measure, a properly calculated liquidity charge 
should be  
 
-higher for portfolios with positions whose sizes are large relative to  market depth, and 
-higher for portfolios with positions in less liquid instruments.  
 
A properly calibrated liquidity charge should therefore deter members from accumulating 
concentrated exposures and illiquid positions, and provides incentives to the Clearing 
Members for managing their exposure to liquidity risk. 
 
The list of centrally cleared OTC derivatives is steadily expanding and for many of them 
liquidity is an essential component of the risk, which cannot be ignored. It is  our opinion 
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that the incorporation of a liquidity charge as described above in margin requirements is an 
essential step towards a sound risk management of CCPs clearing such instruments. A 
corollary to this remark is that, when establishing the eligibility of a new class of instruments 
for clearing, a necessary condition should be the availability of a methodology for evaluating 
the liquidation cost for these instruments. 
  
A correct evaluation of the liquidation cost needs to account for market depth of each 
instrument held in the portfolio and can be a challenging task for complex, multi-asset 
portfolios. An integrated approach to the evaluation of margin requirements, which 
simultaneously addressed market risk and liquidation cost, is described in (Avellaneda & 
Cont, 2012); similar approaches are currently being implemented in several major CCPs. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Allocation of default losses in the event of a Clearing Member default.  
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4. Mutualizing large losses: the CCP Default Fund 
 
The second layer in the loss waterfall of a CCP is the Default Fund. When the initial margin 
contributions of a defaulting member is insufficient to cover the liquidation costs, the 
Default Fund contribution of the Defaulting member is used as a first recourse. However, 
unlike the initial margin contributions which may only be used for covering the contributing 
member’s losses, the Default Funds may be also used to cover other member’s losses: the 
Default Fund mutualizes large losses across all Clearing Members.  Two important questions 
regarding the CCP Default Fund are its size and the allocation of Default Fund 
contributions across Clearing Members.  
 
4.1. Size of the Default Fund 
 
CPSS-IOSCO regulatory guidelines require CCPs to maintain a Default Fund whose size 
suffices for covering liquidation costs of any member of the CCP in extreme but plausible 
market scenarios. This provision, known as “cover one”, implies that the CCP should assess 
its exposure to the default of each Clearing Member, by evaluating  the potential liquidation 
cost of the  member’s portfolio across a range of plausible stress scenarios. The CCP should 
then ensure that the size of the Default Fund exceeds the largest exposure to any member. 
Following multiple failures of Clearing Members in 2008, this requirement has been 
strengthened to “cover two” for systemically important CCPs (CPSS-IOSCO 2012): such 
CCPs should provision for two member defaults. The recent European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) now requires all CCPs  to cover “the default of the 
clearing member to which it has the largest exposures or of the second and third largest 
clearing members, if the sum of their exposures is larger ».2 
 
These requirements are sometimes described as “covering the default losses from the (two) 
largest member(s)”. This interpretation is not correct: the spirit of the guideline (CPSS-
IOSCO 2012) is clearly to provision for the (possibly simultaneous) default of the two 
members to which the CCP has the largest exposure. Since the initial margin of each member is 
offset against its loss, this may or may not correspond to the member(s) with the largest 
initial margin or the member(s) with the largest open interest. For example, if the member 
with the largest (notional) position has also posted a large amount of initial margin, the 
exposure of the CCP to its default may in fact be quite small.  
 
This remark is important, since it entails that Clearing Members to which the CCP will be 
most exposed are typically not those with large directional positions (and equally large 
margin requirements) but rather those who have ‘well-balanced’ portfolios with large long 
and short positions and small ratio of net-to-gross notional value. When margin 
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  EU Regulation 648/2012 Article 42 §3.	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requirements are computed at the portfolio level, such portfolios may end up  with a low 
ratio of margin to gross notional; however the liquidation of multiple long and short 
positions typically entails a liquidation cost which is proportional to the gross notional, 
hence the possibility of a large shortfall for the CCP. 
 
The necessity of considering more than one default emerged following the recent crisis 
during which several large financial institutions failed or encountered severe liquidity 
problems simultaneously. ‘Simultaneous’ refers here to the possibility that a second default 
occurs before the Default Fund can be replenished following the first default. Whereas 
standard default correlation models, such as those used for credit rating of such financial 
institutions, would attach an extremely low probability to the simultaneous default of large 
Clearing Members, the near failure of several large financial institutions during the 2008 
debacle indicates that such scenarios may be a real possibility.  
 
The criterion of “two defaults” has been criticized as being arbitrary and unrelated to the 
number of Clearing Members or their creditworthiness. Indeed, it has been proposed 
(Ghamami 2014) to use instead assumptions on default probabilities and default correlations 
of Clearing Members and determine the Default Fund size as a tail risk measure quantifying 
losses from joint member defaults.  This approach, while more appealing from a quantitative 
perspective, has in fact more pitfalls than advantages: it requires to specify (unobservable) 
joint default probabilities for Clearing Members, which are often large financial institutions 
whose creditworthiness is difficult to assess, making this approach difficult to validate. The 
“cover N” approach, on the other hand, offers a robust alternative which considers the 
worst-case scenario across all possible member defaults without making (unverifiable) 
assumptions on their joint default probabilities.  
 
The choice of N=2 seems somewhat arbitrary: some CCPs have a dozen Clearing Members, 
others more than a hundred. However, it should also be noted that CCPs with a broad 
membership also have a high degree of heterogeneity in the sizes and open positions of the 
Clearing Members, and the exposures to the largest Clearing Members (which typically 
number around a dozen) dominate the risk of the CCP, so the situation is not so different as 
it seems. One might object that this choice neglects the possibility of a large number of small 
member defaults, which may occur in a CCP with a broad membership: such a scenario 
deserves to be considered if there is a high degree of overlap (or concentration) across many 
Clearing Member portfolios, a possibility that the CCP can identify by monitoring the 
members positions on an ongoing basis. If a large number of members develop 
concentrated, overlapping positions, then the CCP may consider increasing the Default 
Fund to provision for their joint failure.  
 
Another important issue in the calculation of the Default Fund size is the calculation of the 
default losses in the event of the default of a large Clearing Member. The scenarios based on 
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which the Default Fund is sized involve the default of members with large positions with the 
CCP. These members often turn out to be large broker-dealer banks, whose default is very 
likely to be associated with a high level of market volatility (Duffie 2010) and/or widened 
bid-ask spreads. The calculation of liquidation costs for Clearing Member portfolios should 
therefore go beyond the current mark-to-market value of the portfolio and account for 
adverse market moves and widening of bid-ask spreads in a market stress scenario. 
 
Although margin requirements are updated daily by most CCPs, the Default Fund is 
sometimes updated less frequently. Whatever method is used to compute the size of the 
Default Fund, it should be clear from the discussion above that it depends on the 
configuration of Clearing Member portfolios. Thus, substantial changes in the positions of 
clearing members warrant a recalculation of Default Fund contributions. The size of the 
Default Fund should therefore be updated as frequently as required by the turnover of 
member portfolios. The frequency of these adjustments may vary according to the asset 
class. There may also be particular dates, such as index option maturity dates for equity 
options,  index roll dates for credit default swaps and LIBOR fixing dates for interest rate 
swaps, on which one expects a high turnover of positions; it is then important to readjust 
Default Fund contributions at these dates to take into account possible changes in 
portfolios. 
 
4.2. Allocation of Default Fund contributions across Clearing Members 
 
Regulatory oversight of the Default Fund is often limited to inspection of its size, using a 
“cover one” or “cover two” criterion. However, the allocation of Default Fund 
contributions across Clearing Members plays an important role in the incentives it generates 
for Clearing Members and should fall within the scope of any validation of default resources. 
 
The discussion above shows that exposure of the CCP to the default of the Clearing 
Member, not the level of margin or open interest, should be the primary driver of Default 
Fund contributions.  The members most likely to draw on the Default Fund in case of 
failure are not necessarily those with large initial margins, but those who entail a large 
liquidation cost at default for the CCP once margin is accounted for.  To be clear, what we 
are advocating here is that the allocation of Default Fund contribution of a Clearing 
Member be proportional to the exposure of the CCP to the Clearing Member, rather than 
the market risk or margin level of the Clearing Member’s portfolio. 
 
Surprisingly, CPSS-IOSCO does not provide any regulatory guideline regarding the 
allocation of Default Fund contributions across Clearing Members and many CCPs actually 
use other, ad-hoc, allocation rules ranging from a fixed amount to weighted averages of 
open interest, clearing volume and initial margin. EMIR (EU Regulation 648/2012 Article 42 
§3) states that Default Fund contributions « shall be proportional to the exposures of each 
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clearing member » which refers to the exposures of the Clearing Member rather than the 
exposure of the CCP to the Clearing Member.3 
 
It should be clear from the above discussion that such allocation schemes may provide 
distorted incentives to Clearing Members.  Consider the example of a large Clearing Member 
maintaining a large ‘spread trade’ positions: large, symmetric positions in different but 
similar, correlated instruments, such as interest rate swaps or credit default swaps with the 
same underlying but different maturities (curve trades). Such a portfolio has a low ratio of 
‘net notional’ to gross notional; this ratio can even be zero in principle if the long and short 
positions are well-balanced. If the instruments involved in the spread trade are highly 
correlated, such a portfolio will have a low volatility and the member’s “exposure” -and 
therefore its initial margin calculated at the portfolio level- will then be small, and 
proportional to the net, rather than gross, notional.  
 
However, if the notional sizes of these long/short positions are large, the liquidation of such 
a portfolio may turn out to be extremely costly for CCP in case of the Clearing Member’s 
default, and such a large portfolio may be very well the one to which the CCP has the largest 
exposure. Thus, in a scheme where Default Fund contributions are allocated proportional to 
initial margin or a market risk measure of the member’s portfolio, a Clearing Member with a 
well-balanced long/short portfolio may be simultaneously the  one which determines the 
size of the Default Fund  (by generating the largest liquidation cost) while contributing to it 
the least (by minimizing its margin requirement) (Cont 2010)! More generally, the issue is 
that margin is an evaluation of ‘typical risks’ while the Default Fund is designed to cover ‘tail 
risk’: using margin or volume as a basis for allocation generates incentives for ‘free-riding’ 
for Clearing Members, by exposing themselves to tail risk which is then mutualized through 
the Default Fund, while maintaining a low contribution in terms of margin or volume. 
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  From our discussion with various regulators and market participants, most understand the 
issue to be the exposure of the CCP to clearing members, not the (market) exposures of the 
Clearing Members. The wording of EMIR 42 §3 is thus unfortunate and deserves to be 
clarified.	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5. CCP capital and “skin-in-the-game” 
 
5.1. Balance sheet structure of a CCP 
 
Much recent debate has focused on the question of  moral hazard and capital adequacy for 
CCPs, as well as incentives for CCPs to implement proper risk management procedures. 
Such discussions typically point to the fact that CCPs typically maintain equity levels which 
are quite low compared with the large pool of assets they clear and have principally relied on 
collateral posted by members, rather than their own capital, for absorbing losses. This 
reflects the nature of a CCP’s activity as a pure intermediary: although it collects revenue 
proportional to the volume of assets it clears, it does not own these assets and  is only 
exposed to losses of  Clearing Members in excess of their margin and Default Fund 
requirements.  
 
Regulatory discussions often refer to the ‘financial resources’ that the CCP can use to 
‘absorb losses’. In the bank regulation terminology, this would refer to the capital of 
financial institution and its role as a buffer against insolvency. However, in the case of a 
CCP, this rather vague terminology fails to distinguish liquidity risk from solvency risk, a 
distinction which is important for our discussion. To understand this point, let us take a 
closer look at the balance sheet of a CCP. 
 
Figure 5 displays a stylized balance sheet of a CCP. A CCP collects Default Fund 
contributions from its members, and invests them in low-risk, liquid assets, which constitute 
the asset side of the balance sheet. The CCP may also hold other liabilities in the form of 
external debt, but one would expect the liability side of the balance sheet to be dominated by 
liabilities to Clearing Members stemming from Default Fund contributions. 
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Figure 5:  Balance sheet of a CCP. 
 
The assets of the CCP are subject to market fluctuations and, as in a bank portfolio, this 
leads to a prudential requirement that the CCP’s capital be sufficient to  absorb these losses 
across a set of extreme but plausible scenarios, that is, to prevent   insolvency due to market 
losses. But, given that CCPs typically invest in low-risk, high quality assets, the level of 
capital needed for this type of insolvency risk is a very small fraction of the balance sheet. 
 
Losses due to the default of a Clearing Member affect the CCP’s balance sheet in a different 
way. Whereas mark-to-market losses on CCP assets directly affect the capital, default losses 
are first absorbed by the Clearing Member’s margin and Default Fund contribution and then 
flow through the different steps in the loss waterfall. The CCP is affected by default losses 
insofar as it needs to make good on the payments to the counterparties of the defaulted 
member: thus,  in principle, default losses pose a liquidity risk to the CCP, not an insolvency 
risk.  Indeed, one could design a CCP waterfall in which all default losses are allocated to 
non-defaulting members through the Default Fund and other recovery mechanisms. These 
losses would then eventually pose a liquidity risk to the CCP, but would not necessarily 
impact its equity;  if this liquidity risk arises, the CCP  would then attempt to raise further 
liquidity from non-defaulting members and eventually rely on a lender of last resort to 
obtain further liquidity. We call such a CCP design the “liquidity pass-through model” since 
it allocates all default losses to non-defaulting members through the Default Fund. In this 
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situation, the only insolvency risk for the CCP can arise from market losses in its 
investments, not from default losses. A CCP’s revenue being proportional to the volume of 
assets cleared, such a CCP has no incentive to increase margin levels beyond the regulatory 
minimum since a higher margin rate is likely to reduce the volume. 
 
In absence of regulatory constraints, there is no incentive for a profit-maximizing CCP to 
deviate from this “liquidity pass-through” model. In particular, in absence of regulation 
requiring the CCP to expose its own capital to default losses, there is no incentive for the 
CCP to include a capital contribution in the waterfall, unless its members are able to exert 
sufficient pressure for the CCP to do so.  
 
For CCPs, a key issue in designing the capital structure is to provide incentives to the CCP’s 
stakeholders to design a robust risk waterfall. The above observations show that an 
important variable for this purpose is the ‘skin-in-the-game’ of the CCP: the portion of its 
capital which is exposed to default losses in the loss waterfall. The issues are thus quite 
different from those pertaining to capital adequacy for banks, where the discussion has 
centered on the size of the capital buffer (see e.g. Admati & Hellwig 2013).  
 
5.2. Skin-in-the-game  
 
In order to align the risk management incentives of the CCP with those of its members, the 
CCP should be exposed to capital losses before the Default Fund contribution of non-
defaulted members is used. This buffer should constitute a non-negligible fraction of the 
CCP’s equity (current regulatory discussions place it around 20-25%) in order to provide a 
strong incentive for adequate risk management to the CCP.4 In order to align incentives of 
CCP management with Clearing Members, CCP management, and not just shareholders, 
should bear some consequences in the event that this capital buffer is used. 
 
Some waterfall designs call for a second “skin-in-the-game” contribution after the Default 
Fund has been depleted but before any additional resources are deployed in the recovery 
phase (see Figure 3). This is a sound idea and provides incentives to the CCP to maintain an 
adequately sized Default Fund.  
 
Such provisions are already in place at most CCPs, but the issue has been that given the low 
level of CCP equity, the size of the CCP’s equity contribution is sometimes negligible 
compared to the Default Fund. The reason is that the many CCPs have maintained capital 
levels in view of the (non-default) risks faced by the CCP’s treasury rather than as a 
provision for Clearing Member default losses, which were traditionally viewed as a liquidity 
requirement affecting the collateral pool. The Basel Committee’s more recent guidelines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  EMIR (Reg. 153/2013 Article 35 §2) requires the CCP’s contribution  to be 25% of its capital.	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(BCBS 2013) try to address this by formulating capital adequacy criteria for CCPs which 
combine the non-default risk of the CCP’s assets and the loss waterfall, albeit in a rather 
opaque way which is difficult to rationalize (Ghamami 2014). 
 
Given the impossibility of estimating the probabilities of  events -joint defaults of Clearing 
Members- that may affect the CCP’s capital, it is difficult to adopt a quantitative, formula-
based approach to CCP capital adequacy in terms of confidence levels, as done, for instance, 
for bank capital. If one keeps in mind that one purpose for maintaining CCP capital is “skin-
in-the-game”, this implies that CCP capital should be comparable in size to the Default 
Fund contributions of the Clearing Members, so that the CCP faces losses of the same order 
of magnitude in case the “skin-in-the-game” is breached.  Requiring the “skin-in-the-game” 
of the CCP to match, say, the largest Default Fund contribution of any member will also 
deter the CCP from accumulating a large exposure to any single Clearing Member. Similar 
ideas may be found in  recent proposals by market participants (JP Morgan 2014, BlackRock 
2014). 
 
The presence of “skin-in-the-game” provisions transforms what is initially a liquidity risk 
resulting from default losses (as in the “liquidity pass-through model” described in 5.1) into 
insolvency risk for the CCP, which clearly affects the shareholders of the CCP. A further 
problem which needs to be tackled is the possible misalignment of incentives between 
shareholders and management (the so-called ‘principal-agent problem’).  In order to align 
incentives of CCP management with  shareholders and Clearing Members, CCP 
management should bear some consequences in the event that the CCP’s capital buffer is 
used. This may involve retention of bonuses or removal of management. 
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6.  Assessing the default resources of a CCP 
 
6.1. Stress testing of default resources 
 
A necessary step in the assessment of a CCP’s default resources -margin requirements, 
default fund contribution and the CCP’s “skin-in-the-game” contribution- is stress-testing. 
 
Stress testing is sometimes interpreted to be synonymous with historical backtesting but 
based on  a longer test period which includes periods of severe market turbulence: one 
compares, for  every day in the sample, the possible losses (over the risk horizon)  arising 
from the default of (one or two) Clearing Members with the CCP’s default resources at the 
time of default. The goal is to assess whether the default resources of the CCP (margin 
requirements and Default Fund) would have been sufficient to absorb these losses.  
A broader  approach to stress-testing involves counterfactual scenarios, designed to 
represent extreme but plausible changes in the risk factors.  
 
A common approach is to apply these stress tests to current Clearing Member portfolios; 
given the turnover in member portfolios, adequacy of default resources in such a stress test  
does not tell us whether other configurations of member portfolios will not fail the stress 
test. 
 
A more comprehensive validation should involve not just  current Clearing Member 
portfolios but also hypothetical ‘test’ porfolios which may represent possible positions that 
members may bring to the CCP. This allows to track potential weaknesses in the design of 
the loss waterfall and identify “worst-case portfolio configuration” which maximize the 
strain on the CCP’s default resources.  
 
6.2 Beyond single CCP stress tests: accounting for interconnectedness 
 
Current CCP stress testing is limited to stress tests performed on a single CCP. However, 
since large financial institutions  typically belong simultaneously to several CCPs and given 
the interoperating agreements between many CCPs, isolated stress tests of  single CCPs may 
fail to  provide an accurate picture of the levels of collateral and liquidity demand that 
clearing members may be subject to in the event of the default of one or more other clearing 
members.  
 
Consider the case of several large dealer banks with positions in several classes of 
derivatives, each cleared in a different CCP. If one of these banks defaults on its margin calls 
in one of the CCPs, it will simultaneously default on its positions in all  CCPs of which it is a 
member, leading to possible draws on the Default Fund of one or more CCPs. If this dealer 
bank happens to be the ‘largest member’ of one or more of the CCPs, its default may result 
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in simultaneous calls for liquidity on the surviving banks emanating from more than one 
CCP. This examples shows that the liquidity exposures of a Clearing Member to multiple 
CCPs, far from being independent, may turn out to be highly correlated to the same event, 
namely the default of another  large Clearing Member. 
 
Another example is the case of a large Clearing Member to which a CCP’s exposure is 
largest. This exposure determines the size of the Default Fund under a ‘cover one’ rule. Now 
assume there existing a second, competing CCP clearing the same asset class. By dividing its 
positions across two CCPs, this member may avoid being identified as the CCP’s largest 
exposure; this may lead to less Default Funds in total for the CCPs than if the large Clearing 
Member clears through a single CCP. Such a situation can only be acknowledged through 
regulatory supervision or information sharing between CCPs on common members. 
 
A realistic assessment of the systemic risk associated with a CCP failure thus calls for  stress 
tests which accounts for the interconnectedness of different CCPs, in particular through the 
presence of common Clearing Members. Such stress tests require data sharing between 
CCPs and monitoring  of cross-membership and cross-margin agreements by supervisory 
authorities. 
 
6.3 How risky are Default Fund assets? 
 
An important issue regarding stress testing is how to make use of the results of a stress test. 
Beyond a simple assessment of failure or success, stress tests may be used as a method for 
assessing the risk of assets held in the Default Fund. These assets, which remain on the 
balance sheet of the Clearing Member, are subject to a capital charge and are affected a “risk 
weight” which, under the Basel III proposal, is 2% for “qualified CCPs”. A more complex 
formulation has been proposed for risk weights attached to Default Fund exposures5. 
Default Funds of CCPs have been growing in size over the last few years and may constitute 
a substantial sum in the balance sheet of Clearing Members, so the issue of these risk 
weights and the associated capital charges is quite important. 
 
It should be clear from the presentation of the CCP loss waterfall that the risk of assets held 
in the Default Fund depends on “what’s underneath”, i.e the level of margin requirements 
and ‘skin-in-the-game’, which varies across CCPs.  In this respect, a risk weight attached to 
Default Fund exposures which does not take into account the quality of the risk 
management of the CCP would provide the wrong risk incentives and encourage a “race to 
the bottom”.  
 
To use a “CDO” analogy, each Clearing member is exposed to the first losses in its own 
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portfolio (“equity tranche”) up to the level given by its margin plus its Default Fund 
contribution;   losses exceeding this level flow are first absorbed by a portion of the CCP’s 
capital (“mezzanine tranche”) and then absorbed by other members’ Default Fund 
contribution. Thus, each member holds the ‘senior tranche’ of other members losses; the 
risk of the assets held against the Default Fund therefore depends on the level of 
subordination of this “senior tranche”, which depends in turn on the level of margin and 
Default Fund requirements in the CCP. Accordingly, the risk weight assigned to Default 
Fund assets and the corresponding capital charge for Clearing Members should depend on 
the quality of the risk management of the CCP, as assessed for example through 
independent stress testing of its default resources. 
 
A risk weight based on a stress test of the default resources of the CCP would provide 
Clearing Members with an incentive to clear with CCPs with better risk management 
standards, whereas a flat risk weight for Default Fund assets encourages a “race to the 
bottom” for a profit-maximizing CCP with the objective of maximizing clearing volume.  
 
Using CCP stress tests for determining the risk of the Default Fund implies some degree of 
standardization in stress tests to ensure comparability of stress test results across CCPs 
clearing the same asset class. This calls for the supervisor, or an independent entity charges 
with stress testing, to design a series of stress scenarios for each asset class which can then 
be used to calibrate Default Fund levels and risk weights.      
 
The comparability of results across CCPs, especially in the same asset class, is important: it 
provides an objective basis for assigning higher risk weights to assets held against Default 
Funds of CCPs deemed less resilient to stress. Differentiation of risk weights across CCPs is 
a natural way of preventing the ‘race to the bottom’ and giving incentives to market 
participants for clearing transaction through CCPs with better risk management standards. 
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6.4.  How reliable are unfunded default resources ? 
 
Currently, most CCP waterfalls include unfunded default resources, the most important of which 
is  an assessment right for Default Fund contributions : in the event that the existing Default 
Fund is insufficient to cover losses, the CCP may request from all (non-defaulted) Clearing 
Members an additional contribution proportional to their previous contribution to the 
Default Fund. in order to replenish the Default Fund. In some CCPs, the contribution is 
uncapped. In other CCPs, this contribution is  capped by the pre-default contribution of 
each member.  
 
The presence of such assessment rights potentially gives the CCP access to a much larger 
pool of resources to cover losses in stress scenarios. Even in the case where the assessment 
right is capped by the pre-default contribution of clearing members, this leads to a pool 
which is double the size of the (funded portion of the) Default Fund. Some CCPs treat this 
unfunded portion as part of their default resources when performing stress tests.  
 
However, if one considers that the depletion of the Default Fund will most probably occur 
in a stress scenario where two large Clearing Members have already defaulted, the risk that 
other non-defaulted members may fail  to raise enough liquidity to make large payments to 
the Default Fund in such a stress scenario is non-negligible. This is due to the fact that some 
non-defaulted members may have been partially exposed to the same shocks or market 
losses which resulted in the failure of defaulted members.  
 
This observation shows that the unfunded portion of the Default Fund should be 
considered as an uncertain cash flow and that the risk of its non-payment is correlated with 
the default events which trigger the assessment rights. In the terminology of credit risk, the 
unfunded portion of a CCP default fund is in general subject to « wrong-way risk ». To our 
knowledge, this aspect has not been taken into account when assessing default resources of 
CCPs and the unfunded portion is sometimes incorrectly considered on the same level as the 
funded component in stress tests. We also note that a quantitative assessment of this wrong 
way risk may be quite challenging, so a conservative baseline assumption in CCP stress tests 
would be to rely solely on funded resources. 
 
Even in the situation where the surviving members have the necessary resources for meeting 
the assessment payments for replenishing the Default Fund, they will have an incentive not 
to do so, by terminating their membership  and either closing their positions  or migrating to 
another CCP.  
 
Some CCPs have clauses in their membership agreements which enforce the CCP’s 
assessment rights by considering non-payment of the assessment as a default of the non-
paying member ; this may reduce the risk of non-payment from the CCP’s viewpoint, this 
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may have undesirable consequences from a financial stability perspective. Indeed, such a 
mechanism subjects surviving members to potentially large draws on their liquidity resources 
and may lead to their default. Bearing in mind that the intitial purpose of central clearing is 
to mitigate the contagion arising from a member’s default, enforcing a rule which would 
increase the likelihood of other members defaulting in such a scenario would be paradoxical. 
 
In addition to being pro-cyclical, such assessments run the risk of not being provisioned 
when required due to members lacking the liquidity resources in a stress scenario. Thus, the 
unfunded portion of the Default Fund  may not materialize as expected in a stress scenario 
and is subject to wrong-way risk. If the CCP retains assessment rights for the Default Fund, 
such assessment rights should be provisioned for in the liquidity reserve of Clearing 
Members in order to ensure payment. If the Clearing Member is a bank, such assessment 
rights should enter into the denominator of the member’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio as a 
liquidity outflow in a stress scenario. Under the Basel III bank liquidity regulation 
framework, this forces the bank to provision for the unfunded portion of the Default Fund 
upfront, which requires the assessment to be capped and makes it less of an advantage 
compared  with the funded portion of the Default fund contribution.  
 
In summary, we have argued that although there may be no downside for the CCP itself in 
including such unfunded components in the loss waterfall, the above arguments show that 
these unfunded contributions  
 
-may fail to materialize when needed and they should be treated as subject to wrong way 
risk ; in particular the actual contribution of Default Fund assessment rights to the default 
resources of the CCP may in fact be much less than suggested by their notional size and 
difficult to assess in an objective manner; 
 
-should be provisioned for in the liquidity reserves of Clearing Members which, if the 
members are banks, affects their Liquidity Coverage Ratio; 
 
-in the event that their payment is enforced, they may lead to undue stress on liquidity 
resources of non-defaulted Clearing Members and act as a mechanism of contagion for 
liquidity shocks, which contradicts the  very purpose of the CCP. 
 
Prudential regulation of CCPs should therefore take into account the risky nature of 
unfunded resources and give priority to funded resources. This is contrast to Basel III 
proposals (BCBS 2013) which do not distinguish funded and unfunded Default Fund 
contributions when determining the CCP’s default resources or risk weights for default fund 
exposures. 
 
Some market participants (JP Morgan 2014 ; BlackRock) have in fact argued against 
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including any unfunded portion in a CCP’s default resources. Whether or not one supports 
this view, which is not without merit, the above discussion pleads for relying primarily on 
funded resources when assessing the default resources of a CCP for stress testing purpose 
and recognizing the possibility of non-payment of any unfunded resources such as Default 
Fund assessment rights.  From a financial stability perspective, such assessment rights 
should be capped and either provisioned for by Clearing Members in terms of liquidity 
reserves or removed from the table. 
 
7. The end of the waterfall : recovery mechanisms for CCPs 
 
In the situation where the losses exceed the total available Default Fund (including 
assessments) and the CCP’s contribution from its own capital, one reaches the “end of the 
waterfall”. In such a scenario, most other financial institutions, such as banks, would enter a 
resolution procedure and restructuring or liquidation would then ensue. However, given the 
CCPs’ systemically important role as a conduit for transactions of other large financial 
institutions, it may be desirable to use further resources to ensure the continuity of the 
CCP’s clearing services to prevent further contagion from the triggering event of the CCP’s 
losses. These operations, known as ‘recovery arrangements’, act as a temporary backstop and 
may, if successful deployed, delay further losses to the CCPs until the market situation is re-
established and default resources may be replenished to pre-stress levels. 
 
7.1 Variation Margin Haircuts (VMGH) 
 
If a Clearing Member defaults primarily due to losses on its positions cleared within the 
CCP, then these losses materialize as large variation margin payments to other Clearing 
members. These variation margin payments are thus sufficient in principle to cover the 
(market) losses generated by the defaulting member’s portfolio.  Variation Margin 
Haircutting (VMGH) consists in using these variation margin payments as a source of funds 
for recovery of the CCP’s default resources. 
 
When haircutting variation margin, the CCP may reduce pro rata the amount it is due to pay 
participants with in-the-money positions, while continuing to collect in full from those 
participants with out-of-the-money positions. This procedure is meant to be a temporary 
means for recovery of the CCP’s default resources. Clearing Members whose variation 
margin payments are withheld may receive notes which they may redeem once the CCP has 
recovered; alternatively they may receive shares of the CCP’s equity. 
 
The key attractive feature of VMGH is that it taps a resource which, by definition,  is 
sufficient to absorb the market losses of the defaulting member’s portfolio since this loss is 
mirrored in variation margins flowing to the counterparty. However, if loss of resources of 
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the CCP is due to some other reason, such as a  sudden loss in value of  assets held in the 
Default Fund, VMGH may not be very helpful.  
 
Another desirable feature of VMGH is that it allocates losses across surviving members 
similarly to what would occur in a resolution, while providing for continuity of clearing 
services and avoiding the irreversibility and costs associated with a full resolution.  
 
In summary, VMGH can be an efficient recovery mechanism when losses arise from a large 
mark-to-market loss in instruments cleared by the CCP, but not when the loss originates 
from non-default losses of assets held in the CCP’s treasury of Default Fund.  
 
However, it should be kept in mind that VMGH restores the liquidity resources of the CCP 
at the expenses of Clearing Members. In a stress scenario where Clearing Members are 
otherwise subject to liquidity shocks, this may lead to further strain on the liquidity resources 
of Clearing Members.  Thus, while it will be always in the interest of the CCP to use VMGH 
for its own recovery, the supervisor should assess the pros and cons of doing so and should 
have the option of discontinuing or limiting the use of VMGH by the CCP in the interest of 
preventing the default of systemically important clearing members.  
 
7.2 Liquidity provision during the recovery process 
 
The triggering of the recovery phase signals a shortage of liquidity for the CCP. CCPs 
identified as systemically important should therefore be granted access to central bank 
liquidity facilities in the event of a liquidity shortage.  
 
Recovery mechanisms such as VMGH shift the demand for liquidity from the CCP to its 
surviving Clearing Members. The liquidity requirements in such scenarios should be 
transparent to the Clearing Members and provisioned for; for example, if Clearing Members 
are banks subject to a Liquidity Coverage Ratio, the liquidity demands resulting from CCP 
recovery scenarios should be included in the calculation of ‘liquidity stress scenario’ entering 
the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and provisioned for by the Clearing Member. The lender of 
last resort may choose to provide access to its liquidity facilities to Clearing Members subject 
to VMGH, supporting indirectly in this way the  recovery of the CCP. 
 
If the CCP and its members are registered in different jurisdictions, typically only the central 
bank of the jurisdiction where the CCP  is registered may agree to provide  direct liquidity to 
the CCP.  It may then be in the interest of central banks of Clearing Members’ jurisdictions 
to contribute indirectly to the replenishment of the CCP’s liquidity resources during the 
recovery phase by providing liquidity facilities to member institutions in their jurisdiction. 
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7.3. Contract tear-ups 
 
If variation margin haircuts fail to provide enough relief to the CCP to continue its 
operations, the possibility for the CCP of closing certain unbalanced open positions 
provides a further backstop against continued losses. Such contract tear-ups may be partial 
or total and are usually restricted to the instrument(s) in which positions are unbalanced 
following a member’s default. 
 
The possibility of partial or total contract tear-up implies that the netting function of the 
CCP may fail in a default scenario, even before resolution is reached. In a recent position 
paper, ISDA (ISDA 2013) has argued that this is an undesirable feature since it contradicts 
the very purpose of a CCP. 
 
The loss of a Clearing Member from the tear-up depends on the positions of the Defaulting 
Member and the choice of contracts subject to tear-up among these positions. None of 
these elements are known to non-defaulting Clearing Members beforehand, which results in 
an uncertainty which is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify: : being unable to anticipate 
which contracts may be subject to tear-up, Clearing Members cannot properly evaluate their 
exposure to such a scenario. Therefore, contract tear-up leads to a loss allocation across 
members which is not transparent ex-ante and increases uncertainty for Clearing Members 
without providing clear incentives. 
 
In addition, the loss allocation resulting from contract tear-up may appear as unfair ex-post 
compared to a proper resolution procedure since, unless tear-up applied to all contracts, the 
allocation of losses will not be proportional to outstanding liabilities of the defaulted 
member.  
 
7.4. Should ‘initial margin’ be used to fund a CCP’s recovery?  
 
Some recent discussions in regulatory circles have invoked the possible use of initial margin 
deposited by non-defaulted Clearing Members as a liquidity resource to enable the recovery 
of a failing CCP, and various versions of such ‘initial margin haircuts’ have been proposed. 
 
In principle the initial margin requirements of a Clearing Member, though deposited with 
the CCP, can only be used to offset losses by the same Clearing Member. This is the main 
feature distinguishing the initial margin contributions from the Default Fund contributions, 
which are exposed to the losses of other members.  
 
Since initial margin funds are deposited with the CCP, such ‘initial margin haircuts’ seem to 
be a way for the CCP to grab readily available liquidity resources to help its recovery. 
However, this proposal appears to have some major flaws.  
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Exposing initial margin contributions to default losses generated by other Clearing member 
through the possibility of ‘initial margin haircuts’ amounts to including a contingency clause 
which converts initial margin funds into Default Funds in the event the  ‘recovery’ regime is 
triggered.  In the end, it amounts to reallocating a (initially unknown) fraction of the initial 
margin to the Default Fund. This blurs the distinction between initial margin and Default 
Fund contributions and renders the risk analysis of the loss waterfall much more complex, 
especially for the Clearing Members, since they cannot correctly estimate the risk of such a 
scenario occurring without knowledge of other members positions. A simpler  and more 
transparent design would be to size the Default Fund correctly in order to avoid such a 
scenario, instead of adding to it a random fraction of the initial margin pool, as this scheme 
implicitly does. 
 
Initial margin haircuts may also lead to legal complications. The membership charter of most 
CCPs  does not allow the use of initial margin funds of a Clearing Member for  covering 
losses of other members, so such procedures may infringe upon property rights of Clearing 
Members and contractual agreements with the CCP. 
 
Last but not least, the loss allocation resulting from ‘initial margin haircuts’ does not seem to 
provide the right incentives in terms of risk management. If initial margins haircuts are 
applied proportionally, the resulting allocation exposes most the members whose initial 
margin contribution is the largest,  instead of penalizing those to which the CCP is most 
exposed. This would push towards a ‘race to the bottom’ and provide incentives to clear 
with CCPs whose margin levels are low, unless the Default Fund is deemed large enough to 
render the possibility of initial margin haircuts remote. 
 
In summary, we find that ‘intial margin haircuts’ do not seem to be a good idea: they blur the 
distinction between margin requirements and Default Fund contributions, and distort 
Clearing Members’ risk incentives. If the Default Fund allocations, as suggested above, are 
proportional to the exposure of the CCP to each Clearing Member, then a better design is 
simply to increase the global size of the Default Fund, instead of introducing ‘initial margin 
haircuts’. 
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8. When all else fails : resolution of a failed CCP 
 
When recovery provisions fail to provide the CCP with enough resources to ensure the 
continuity of its clearing services, the CCP may either become insolvent, entering 
bankruptcy proceedings, or enter a failure resolution process. Regulators may also choose to 
trigger failure resolution before the recovery process ends, if they deem that the recovery 
provisions may hurt member firms in a way that is detrimental to financial stability. Various 
aspects of failure resolution of CCPs are extensively discussed by Duffie (2014). 
 
  
The discussion on CCP recovery and resolution should be centered  on avoiding financial 
instability and safeguarding the financial system, rather than maintaining a CCP’s operations 
at all costs. In some scenarios, the regulator may assess that the resolution of a CCP, though 
not in the interest of the CCP or its clearing members, may be better for financial stability 
than the pursuit of the recovery plan.  The resolution authority should then have the right to 
override contractual agreements and halt the recovery process. This decision should be 
based on an assessment of system-wide losses in different scenarios, including spillovers to 
non-member institutions via direct exposures (Cont & Minca 2014), common memberships 
across CCPs, inter-CCP cross-margin agreements or fire sales which can distort the value of 
collateral (Oehmke, 2014).  
 
The decision to trigger failure resolution should also account for the fact that, even if the 
recovery process succeeds in maintaining a weakened CCP afloat, market participants may 
choose to walk away from the CCP either by reducing their open interest or by moving to 
another CCP, since a future failure will expose the members to further liquidity demands 
and losses. Thus, it is often a better option to spin off the CCP’s sustainable activities as a 
separate entity which can continue to sustain its clearing functions while the failed portion is 
being liquidated. This process is greatly facilitated if the CCP maintains separate Default 
Funds for different asset classes it clears, preventing default losses in one asset class from 
contaminating the entire balance sheet. 
 
A key issue is to avoid moral hazard and especially costs to taxpayers in the event of a CCP 
failure.  Though the function of the CCP as a utility in the interest of financial stability can 
be considered a ‘public good’ to some extend, this does not entail that private, third-party  
funds cannot be mobilized to fund the resolution of a failed CCP. Such third-party funds 
may be used for emergency liquidity provision and/or recapitalization of a failed CCP. 
 
An interesting proposal, recently put forth by JP Morgan, is for CCPs to set up a « trust 
fund » to which clearing members and external participants can contribute and which will be 
used in the event of the CCP’s failure to set up a recapitalized « bridge CCP » which then 
inherits the positions of the clearing members from the failed CCP (JP Morgan 2014). The 
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possibility of external participants (non-members) participating in this trust fund is 
particularly attractive as it opens the possibility of funding by investors not directly exposed 
to the risks faced by the CCP. Unlike clearing members, who will be subject to losses during 
the recovery process,  such external participants will be more likely to have the resources for 
supporting the resolution process.  
 
Many major international CCPs have cross-border features, through their membership 
structure, the assets they clear or interoperability agreements with other CCPs. Transparent 
rules for resolution of such complex entities should be established in advance through 
international guidelines and agreements among regulators to avoid an international tug-of-
war during the resolution process. 
 
CCP supervision and resolution often involves multiple authorities, through a complex 
multi-step decision process. In the same way that some CCPs periodically organize ‘default 
management drills’ to simulate the procedures to be followed in case a Clearing Member 
defaults, it would be highly instructive for authorities involved in CCP failure resolution to 
organize a simulation of the failure resolution procedure for systemically important CCPs, 
involving the major actors who would intervene in such a process. Such an exercise would 
reveal possible operational risk and help identify some thorny issues that may arise during 
the resolution process. 
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9 . Summary : Lessons for CCP waterfall design 
 
1. The importance of incentives : When designing loss allocation and recovery mechanisms for a 
CCP, one must bear in mind not only their effectiveness for absorbing losses in a stress 
scenario but also the risk management incentives they provide to the CCP and its clearing 
members in advance of such stress scenarios.  
 
2. Liquidity charges: margin requirements for CCP members should not be solely based on an 
evaluation of the market risk of their portfolio but also include a liquidity charge which 
corresponds to the potential additional cost incurred by the CCP for liquidating the 
member’s portfolio in an extreme but plausible market scenario. A properly calibrated 
liquidity charge will deter members from accumulating concentrated exposures and provide 
incentives to members for managing their liquidity risk. 
 
3. Size of CCP Default Funds: in determining the size of the Default Fund to cover losses in 
case of a given number of Clearing Member defaults, a CCP should not rely on 
(unverifiable) assumptions on the default probabilities or default correlations of Clearing 
Members but consider the worst-case scenario loss for the CCP across all possible defaults. 
The size of the Default Fund depends on the configuration of Clearing Member portfolios 
and should be updated as frequently as required by the turnover of member portfolios. 
 
4. Allocation of Default Fund contributions across Clearing Members: the contribution of a Clearing 
Member to the Default Fund  should be based on the exposure of the CCP to the default of 
this Clearing Member. Other allocation schemes, proportional to initial margin, open interest 
or trading volume, may provide distorted risk incentives to Clearing Members.  
 
5. Skin in the game: A CCP’s capital should be exposed to default losses before the Default 
Fund contribution of non-defaulted members is used and once the Default Fund is depleted. 
The magnitude of these exposures should be comparable in size to the Default Fund 
contributions of Clearing Members and should constitute a non-negligible fraction of the 
CCP’s equity in order to provide a strong incentive for adequate risk management to the 
CCP. Without such ‘skin-in-the-game’, default of Clearing Members would pose little or no 
insolvency risk to the CCP. In order to align incentives of CCP management with Clearing 
Members, CCP management should bear some consequences in the event that this capital 
buffer is used. 
 
6. Stress testing of CCP default resources: The adequacy of default resources of a CCP should be 
subject to independent stress testing using a transparent methodology comparable across 
CCPs clearing the same instruments. Stress testing should not be limited to historical 
scenarios but should also include counterfactual but plausible risk scenarios relevant for the 
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asset class being cleared. Such stress tests can provide an objective basis for determining 
capital charges against assets held in the Default Fund.  
 
7. Risk weights attached to CCP Default Funds: Assets held in the CCP Default Fund have the  
risk profile of the senior tranche of the CCP’s exposure to member defaults. Accordingly, 
the risk weight attached to a CCP Default Fund should depend on the subordination of this 
tranche, which in turn depends on the margin pool and the CCP’s “skin-in-the-game”. 
Capital charges for CCP default funds based on an independent and objective  assessment of 
the risk of the default fund will provide  an incentive for clearing with CCPs with better risk 
management standards.  
 
8. Accounting for interconnectedness in risk assessment: Due to cross-membership of large financial 
across multiple CCPs and  interoperating agreements between CCPs, isolated stress tests of  
single CCPs do not provide an accurate picture of  losses in the event of the default of one 
or more clearing members. A realistic assessment of the systemic risk associated with the 
failure of a clearing member calls for a stress test which accounts for the interconnectedness 
of different CCPs and their clearing members. Such stress tests, which may call for data 
sharing across CCPs or the participation of regulators, should form the basis for identifying 
systemically important CCPs. 
 
9. Recovery provisions such as Default Fund assessments, Variation Margin haircuts (VMGH) 
and the possibility of contract tear-ups may provide temporary relief to the CCP in a stress 
scenario and avoid a costly and irreversible resolution procedure. Exposures resulting from 
recovery provisions need to be transparent for clearing members and capped in their 
magnitude. Transparency provides clearing members a clear view of their exposures in a 
stress scenario and incentives to manage these exposures. A key question is whether 
recovery provisions, which tend to shift the liquidity demand in a stress scenario from the 
CCP to the members, will not increase the likelihood of further Clearing Member failures. 
 
10. Unfunded default resources : Current CCP waterfall designs allow for an assessment on 
Default Fund contributions, which is either uncapped or can go up to the existing Default 
Fund contribution of each member. Such assessments run the risk of not being provisioned 
when required, due to members lacking the liquidity resources in a stress scenario. Thus, the 
unfunded portion of the Default Fund  may not materialize as expected in a stress scenario 
and is subject to wrong-way risk. A conservative stress test should therefore refrain from 
assuming the availability of unfunded default resources, and priority should be given to 
funded resources. If the Default Fund does allow for assessment rights, these should be 
capped and provisioned for in the liquidity reserves of Clearing Members. 
 
11. Variation Margin haircuts (VMGH) allocate losses similarly to what would occur in a 
resolution, while providing for continuity of clearing services and avoiding the irreversibility 
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and costs associated with a full resolution. VMGH can be   efficient when losses arise from a 
large mark-to-market loss in instruments cleared by a CCP, but not when a member defaults 
due to losses in assets not cleared by the CCP. 
 
12. Access to central bank liquidity: The triggering of the recovery phase signals a shortage 
of liquidity for the CCP. CCPs identified as systemically important should be granted access 
to central bank liquidity facilities in the event of a liquidity shortage. If the CCP and its 
members are registered in different jurisdictions, it may be in the interest of central banks of 
Clearing Members’ jurisdictions to contribute indirectly to the replenishment of the CCP’s 
liquidity resources during the recovery phase by providing liquidity facilities to Clearing 
members registered in their jurisdiction. 
 
13. Contract tear-ups : The  possibility for the CCP of closing certain unbalanced open 
positions provides a further backstop against continued losses. However, contract tear-up 
results in a loss allocation across members which is not transparent ex-ante and thus does 
not provide clear incentives to Clearing Members, and may appear as unfair ex-post 
compared to a proper resolution procedure.   
 
14. Initial margin haircuts: It has been proposed to use the initial margin of non-defaulted 
members as a source of funds for the CCP during recovery. Such ‘initial margin haircuts’ 
blur the distinction between margin requirements and Default Fund contributions, reduce 
transparency of risk exposures for Clearing Members and distort Clearing Members’ risk 
incentives. If the Default Fund contributions are proportional to the exposure of the CCP to 
Clearing Members, then a better idea is simply to increase the size of the Default Fund. 
 
15. Financial stability, not survival at all costs : The discussion on CCP recovery and 
resolution should be centered not on maintaining a CCP’s operations at any cost but on 
avoiding financial instability and safeguarding the financial system. In some scenarios, failure 
resolution of a CCP, though not in the interest of the CCP or its clearing members, may be 
better for financial stability than the pursuit of a recovery plan.  The resolution authority 
should then have the right to override contractual agreements and halt the recovery process. 
This decision should be based on an assessment of system-wide losses in different scenarios, 
including spillovers to non-member institutions via direct exposures, common memberships 
across CCPs, inter-CCP cross-margin agreements or the risk of fire sales. 
 
16. Need for international guidelines on cross-border resolution : Many CCPs have cross-border 
features, through their membership structure, the assets they clear or interoperability 
agreements with other CCPs. Transparent rules for resolution of such complex entities and 
liquidity provision during resolution should be established in advance through international 
guidelines and agreements among regulators to avoid an international tug-of-war during the 
resolution process. 
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